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Per the NASA Human Health, Life Support and Habitation System Technology Area 06 
report “crewed missions venturing beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) will require technologies 
with improved reliability, reduced mass, self-sufficiency, and minimal logistical needs as an 
emergency or quick-return option will not be feasible”.1  To meet this need, the development 
team of the second generation Cascade Distillation System (CDS 2.0) chose a development 
approach that explicitly incorporate consideration of safety, mission assurance, and 
autonomy.  The CDS 2.0 preliminary design focused on establishing a functional baseline that 
meets the CDS core capabilities and performance.  The critical design phase is now focused 
on incorporating features through a deliberative process of establishing the systems failure 
modes and effects, identifying mitigation strategies, and evaluating the merit of the proposed 
actions through analysis and test.   This paper details results of this effort on the CDS 2.0 
design. 
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DVANCEMENTS in environmental control and life support systems will be necessary in order to make human 
exploration missions beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) viable in the next few decades.  Without an established 
supply chain, options for timely emergency supplies, and no quick-return options, the crew will need to be equipped 
for self-sufficiency like never before.  The overall reliability of critical mission systems will be of paramount concern.  
The current regenerative life support system aboard the International Space Station relies on system redundancy, 
spares for replacement at the subsystem and assembly level, emergency stores and resupply to maintain consistent life 
support for the crew.  Even lunar missions had an abort path that could return crew to Earth within a reasonable amount 
of time to rely on emergency life support resources. A human exploration mission to Mars will not have to the benefit 
of proximity to Earth or a well-established supply chain; every consumable, including maintenance and emergency 
resources, will need to be included.  “Today, it costs $10,000 to put a pound of payload in Earth orbit.”  Efforts are 
being made to reduce this 100-fold by 20252,3.  Even so, making a mission to Mars fiscally viable will involve making 
careful trades between reliability and mass.   
As experienced in the Constellation Program, full focus on safety and mission assurance (S&MA) comes at a price. 
After suffering an architecture design that did not close from a mass perspective, the Constellation program adopted 
an approach that would balance these seemingly competing objectives.4  A similar approach is being employed in the 
design of a flight forward advanced water recovery system based on the cascade distillation technology, referred to as 
CDS 2.0.  Using the experience gained from a CDS prototype ground test system, referred to as the Blue Box, as well 
as from the Urine Processor Assembly aboard the ISS, a baseline functional architecture was established.  This baseline 
architecture reduced the part count by more than 50%.  The project is now in the process of re-integrating components 
required to meet the S&MA goals of the project. 
II. Background 
A. Cascade Distillation System 
The Cascade Distillation System (CDS) employs thin-film vacuum rotary distillation to recovery water from 
wastewater. Fig. 1 presents a simple schematic of the CDS. The centrifugal force generated by the rotation is harnessed 
by pitot pumps within the distiller; this along with a balancing of pressures throughout the system provide the motive 
force for fluids without the need for additional pumps. The process generates a non-potable water distillate with more 
than 90% of the contaminants removed; further processing is required to remove the remaining contaminants before 
the water is safe for consumption.  This distillate is generated by evaporating water from the wastewater and 
condensing the steam.  The batch process is 
stopped with the residual wastewater, or 
brine, has reached its maximum 
concentration; over processing could lead to 
the formation of the solids in the system that 
could cause performance degradation 
and/or hardware damage (ref. 5).  
The key components of the CDS include 
the distiller, the heat pump, 3 tanks, the 
vacuum pump, a trim cooler, feed and 
product flow regulators and various valves 
to manage the flow.  The system also 
includes a power distribution system and an 
embedded controller capable of automating 
the core batch operation of the CDS without 
human interaction.  Additional 
instrumentation is needed to support this 
automation process.   
The goal of CDS 2.0 development effort 
is to develop a flight-forward prototype.  
The resultant hardware will primarily be 
used in ground testing; there design will support operation aboard the ISS as a payload experiment. 
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Figure 1.  Simplified block diagram of a cascade distillation 
system. The blue stream represents the flow of distillate, the yellow 
stream indicates the flow of waste water, both fresh and partially 
concentrated, the orange stream represents concentrated brine, and 
the green stream represents the flow of vacuum. 
 
  




B. Assessing CDS Reliability 
Although reliability is recognized by the agency as an important area of advancement, the tools available for 
evaluating a system for reliability are generally retrospective.  The tools consider systems that are well defined and 
any quantitative analysis requires a significant empirical data set for the components employed in the system.  The 
means by which an emerging system designs with unique prototype level components could be evaluated and 
optimized for reliability was considered in a series of events hosted by the AES Water Recovery Project in the spring 
of 2013. This campaign included an educational series in which experts from across the agency and academia provided 
information on terminology, tools, and techniques associated with evaluating and designing for system reliability. The 
campaign culminated in a workshop that included members of the Environmental Control and Life Support System 
and AES communities.  The course presented by the JSC S&MA organization included a description of tools for 
evaluating systems for reliability such as the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes & Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD), and fault trees (ref. 6).  Given the immaturity of the design, the PRA 
would not be an effective tool at this stage of the CDS development.  It was decided that variations of the latter 3 tools 
would be used. 
III. Assessment 
The project opted to focus on developing a failure modes, effect and criticality analysis (FMECA).  The CDS 2.0 
FMECA was derived from the CDS 2.0 system model generated using the Systems Modeling Language (SysML), a 
graphical modling language for representing requirements, behavior, structure, and properties of a system and its 
components.8 
A. Failure Mode Ranking 
Using the FMECA (instead of an FMEA), numerical ratings of the failure mode’s effects were rated, allowing for 
a ranking to be established among the failure modes.  The ranking was then used as a basis for addressing the failure 
mode; i.e. identifying whether the failure mode should be mitigated and to what extent.  
1. Consequence Levels 
The consequence ratings are tailored to the project based on hazard ratings defined by the International Space 
Station and by the JSC Crew and Thermal Systems Division (CTSD) Testing Branch. A catastrophic hazard, or 
Category I hazard, is one that can result in a disabling or fatal personnel injury, or loss of the vehicle (ISS).  ISS 
requires two fault tolerance in these instances. A critical hazard, or Category II hazard, is one that can result in a non-
disabling injury, loss of a major ISS life sustaining function or emergency system, or involves damage to the flight 
vehicle.  The system is required to be single fault tolerant in these cases.9  All other hazards are considered Marginal, 
Class III, hazards.  These are hazards that may lead to major damage to an emergency system, damage to a non-critical 
ISS element, or minor personnel injury or occupational illness.  The CTSD consequence levels are similar, except 
defined in terms of ground system and facility damage.  A fourth class is included in their definition referring to 
negligible hazards that minor injury to personnel that might require some first aide and minor damage to facilities, 
equipment or flight hardware.10  The project incorporated a classification system that addressed payload mission 
assurance while meeting the spirit of the classifications set by ISS and CTSD.  The resultant rating are as follows: 
 Level 1: A condition that may cause death or permanently disabling injury, facility destruction on the ground, or 
loss of the ISS.  
 Level 2: A condition that may cause severe injury or occupational illness, major property damage to facilities, 
systems, equipment, or flight hardware on the ground, loss of a major ISS element, damage/significant impact to 
a life sustaining function or emergency system, loss of other ISS payloads, or loss of the CDS.  
 Level 3: A condition that may cause minor injury or occupational illness, minor property damage to facilities, 
systems, equipment or flight hardware, damage to non-critical ISS-element, or lost/compromised test objectives.  
 Level 4: A condition that could cause the need for minor first-aid treatment but would not adversely affect personal 
safety or health; damage to facilities, equipment, or flight hardware damage beyond normal wear and tear. 
2. Failure Mode Ranking 
During a deep space human exploration mission, it is likely that a loss of the CDS would be considered a Level 1 
hazard. Taking into consideration a baseline functionality only architecture, almost any failure could lead to the loss 
of CDS functionality, and would therefore be classified as a Level 1 failure mode.  In order to provide some resolution 
to the ranking, consequence levels were established taking into consideration CDS 2.0 as a payload experiment.  In 
this case, loss of CDS operation would be considered a Level 3 consequence.  
The objective of the project is to eliminate Level 1 hazards.  Design for minimum risk (DFMR) techniques would 
be utilized in cases where the hazard cannot be eliminated, such as with the CDS 2.0 brine tank which would contain 
  




toxic brine and has the inherent hazard or rupturing or leaking.   Mitigation strategies would be considered for Level 
2 hazards beyond the requisite fault tolerance and hazard controls.  At a minimum, a method of monitoring along and 
alerting personnel to these hazards will be implemented.  Level 3 and 4 mitigation strategies will also be considered, 
though at a lower priority.  The cost associated with implementing these strategies will have to be weighed against the 
likelihood of the hazards occurring.  Without quantitative reliability data, the likelihood ratings are based on subject 
matter expert (SME) input. 
B. Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticalities Modeling Method 
The FMECA is derived from specific relationships defined CDS 2.0 SysML model; this method was developed 
by Tietronix Software, Inc. and described in reference 7.  An overview of the FM meta-model describing relationships 
between model elements is depicted in figure 2.   
The Internal Block Diagram (IBD) depicts how the components in the design are connected. Each part in the IBD 
diagram represents a unique hardware component. Functions are represented as blocks with <<Function>> stereotypes 
applied.  The functions are captured as names in the blocks.11 The behavior of the component is captured in state 
machine diagrams (SMD) owned by the component. Operational states and potential failed states are identified. Failed 
states represent potential failure modes, and are modeled as states with a <<FailedState>> stereotype. The immediate 
effects of each state were identified. The effects describe the performance of the function in a given state. Therefore 
in the Operational “On” state, the intended function is performed; however in the Operational “Off” state and 
<<FailedState>> the effect describes the loss or non-performance of the Function. The immediate Effects of the mode 
states are modeled as blocks with <<Effect>> stereotypes and allocated to states in the state machine models.  
State changes between states are accomplished via state transitions. Transitions consist of a trigger and a guard. 
Triggers can be represented as events (example: operations or signal events). Interactions between state machines are 
accomplished via broadcasted signal actions from one state and signal event triggers on transitions in another state 
machine. Broadcasted signal actions are modeled as entry actions to states. Signals broadcasted must be unique to 
each component.  
The FMECA MagicDraw plug-in12 extracts details about failed states. Failed states represent potential failure 
modes in the FMECA output. The plug-in traverses behavior diagrams to determine potential failure modes and end 
effects for analysis and produces the resulting spreadsheet shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 2: FM Meta-Model 
  




The FTA plug-in13 derives fault trees from any “Effect” stereotyped block. “Effect” stereotyped blocks represent 
potential top level events in the fault trees. The FTA plug-in traverses behavior diagrams to extract the fault event 
paths for analysis. The plug-in creates an XML file of the fault tree that can be imported to fault tree graphical tools. 
A visual GUI display of the fault tree as a MagicDraw pop-up window is also generated by the plug-in.  
 
{Details on application of this methodology to CDS will be provided in the final manuscript} 
 
Figure 3: FMECA (Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis) Data Exchange MagicDraw Plug-In 
 
Figure 4: FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) Data Exchange MagicDraw Plug-In 
  





IV. CDS FMEA Model 
Figure 5. shows the IBD being used to evaluate the CDS 2.0 failure modes’ effects and criticalities.  
Figure 6 shows an example of an state machine model for the vacuum pump (P-CDS2-01).  The vacuum pump 
was attributed 3 states: “Off”, “On”, and “Failed Off”.  Other states were considered, but discounted as non-credible.  
For example, the Failed On state was considered.  The only way for the vacuum pump to fail “On” is if power is 
continuously applied; this is a failure of the avionics or power system not of the vacuum pump itself.  The SMD shows 
that when the vacuum pump is off, it is not pulling vacuum; a placeholder effect of not venting was included to capture 
potential interaction between the vacuum pump and a vent air conditioner or the environment.  In the “On” state, the 
vacuum pump pull vacuum and vents air.  In this state, the vacuum is broadcasting the signal “Vac Pump Pumping”.  
This signal will be received by the CD as one of several signals required for the CD to be in the “Process” state.  In 
order for the vacuum pump to transition between the “On” and “Off” states, a signal must be broadcast from the power 
distribution module reflecting whether or not power is being provided.  The only failed state defined for the vacuum 
pump is the “FailedOff” state.  The only trigger for leading to this state is defined as an internal failure which is 
 
Figure 5 DRAFT. CDS 2.0 Plumbing and Instrumentation Diagram. 
  




modeled as a behavior of the vacuum pump (missing from the diagram is a transition from “On” to “FailedOff”).  
Included in this SMD are options for recovering from the failed state. 
  
V. Results 
At the CDS 2.0 preliminary design review (PDR), a manual assessment produced 58 potential failure modes.  The 
only Level 1 failure modes identified were associated with the feed and brine tanks, since failure of these devices to 
contain their fluid could lead to personnel coming into contact with toxic fluids.  Since these failure modes cannot be 
mitigated, a DFMR approach to tank design will be taken into consideration.  Options include use of components 
already certified for the storage and management of toxic fluids aboard the ISS. 
Several Level 2 failure modes were identified.  These could be classified into the following two groups: 
 Failure modes that lead to exposure of personnel and other ISS equipment to uncontained liquids 
 Failure modes leading to the formation of solids in the recirculating brind loop that could damage the the heat 
pump or the distiller. 
The Level 3 failure modes could be classified as follows: 
 Failure modes leading to corruption or loss of data 
 Failure modes that render the CDS incapable of processing wastewater 
Level 4 hazards were largely associated with failure modes that could lead to degraded performance, product water 
contamination or excessive wear on the CDS components. 
Note that the FMECA considered the CDS 2.0 functional design.  Inherent failures that are not associated with the 
system functionality, such as electrocution hazards, are not included at this time.  
Figure 7 shows a portion of the preliminary FMECA output for the CDS.  This portion highlights 2 valves whose 
function is required for CD operation.  Valve v02product opens the product line from the CD to the product tank; if 
this line isn’t open, the CD will not have anywhere to displace the generated distillate and it will cease to function.  
Valve v04vacCD isolates the CD from the vacuum line; it is required for adequate pressure management.  Individually, 
a failed valve is a level 4 failure, however the model output provides the assigns the level associated with worst case 




Figure 6. State machine model for the CDS 2.0 vacuum pump. 
  





It is no surprise that each failure shows a value of 1 for the “Number of Independent Failures”, given that the 
design is based on minimum functionality.  
 
{model driven results to be expanded upon in the final manuscript} 
VI. Conclusions and Forward Work 
{conclusions to be provided in the final manuscript} 
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